A gloves-associated outbreak of imipenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii in an intensive care unit in Guangdong, China by Dan Ye et al.
Ye et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:179 
DOI 10.1186/s12879-015-0917-9RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessA gloves-associated outbreak of imipenem-resistant
Acinetobacter baumannii in an intensive care unit in
Guangdong, China
Dan Ye1, Jinglan Shan1, Yongbo Huang2,3, Jianchun Li2,3, Changan Li1, Xiaoqing Liu2,3, Weiqun He2,3, Yimin Li2,3*
and Pu Mao2*Abstract
Background: Imipenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii (IRAB) is an important cause of hospital-acquired infection.
We aimed to describe an outbreak of IRAB infection and to investigate its possible source in an intensive care unit.
Methods: An environmental investigation was undertaken. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed by
microdilution. These isolates were genotyped by use of repetitive extragenic palindromic polymerase chain reaction
(rep-PCR; DiversiLab). The study included 11 patients infected with IRAB and 14 control patients free of IRAB. Case and
control patients were compared for possible predisposing factors. A multifaceted intervention was implemented to
control the outbreak.
Results: Thirty-nine IRABs were isolated from patients and the environmental surveillance culture in August, November,
and December 2011. All isolates were resistant to imipenem. The IRAB strains belonged to seven clones (A–G) by
the use of rep-PCR. There were four epidemic clones (D–G) in the outbreak, and Clone D was predominant. For
the case–control study, patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease were susceptible to infection with
IRAB. The hospital mortality of the case group was significantly higher than that of the control group.
Conclusions: The outbreak strains were transmitted among infected patients and equipment by inappropriate
use of gloves. A combination of aggressive infection control measures is essential for preventing recurrent
nosocomial outbreaks of IRAB.
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Acinetobacter baumannii, a non-fermenting Gram-negative
bacterium, is recognized as an important opportunistic
pathogen, and is particularly associated with mortality in
intensive care units (ICUs) [1]. As a result of the simplicity
of its growth requirements and its remarkable capacity for
extended survival on environmental surfaces, A. baumannii
is ubiquitous in the environment [2]. Thus, environmental
contamination is an important source of cross-infection
[3,4]. The carbapenem group of antimicrobial agents
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sistance has been increasingly identified in the past dec-
ade [6,7], and imipenem-resistant A. baumannii (IRAB)
has also been increasingly reported as a cause of noso-
comial outbreaks [8-12].
On August 9, 2011, an outbreak of nosocomial infection
with IRAB was noted in our medical ICU. In this study,
we isolated IRAB from clinical specimens and the hospital
environment, using the DiversiLab repetitive extragenic
palindromic sequence-based PCR (rep-PCR) to assess the
genetic relationship of these resistant isolates.
Methods
The study was approved by the institutional Re-
search Ethical Board of the First Affiliated Hospitalis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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menting outbreak control interventions and collecting
clinical data retrospectively.
Hospital settings
The First Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou Medical
University is a 2,000-bed, teaching hospital, and a ter-
tiary referral center for major respiratory diseases in
Southern China. In 2011, the annual number of admis-
sions to the First Affiliated Hospital of Guangzhou
Medical University was 45,020 and there were 560
admissions to the ICU. The outbreak occurred in a
27-bed medical ICU, where the nurse-to-patient ratio
was 1–1.5:1 during daytime and 1:3 at night. A map of
the ICU is shown in Figure 1.Figure 1 Schematic map of ICU showing the locations of samples that we
environmental surveys in August, November, and December, 2011. (▲) Env
August, November, and December, 2011.Epidemiological investigation
The outbreak period was defined as August 1–23.
Nosocomial infection was defined according to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
[13]. For the case–control study, the cases were de-
fined as those who had stayed in the ICU for at least
48 h with IRAB infection. The controls were patients
without identification of IRAB after screening twice
during the study period. Case and control patients
were screened twice every week.
Demographic (age and sex) and clinical data (duration
of ICU and hospital stay, sites of infection or colonization,
underlying diseases, diagnosis, antibiotic classes used,
mechanical ventilation, blood transfusion, hemodialysis,
SOFA score, APACHE II urinary catheter, nasogastricre positive for IRAB. (●) Patients with isolates positive for IRAB during
ironmental samples positive for IRAB during environmental surveys in
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arterial catheter, and clinical outcome) were extracted
from the patient medical records.
Microbiological methods
Research assistants swabbed potential fomites in the
patient environment during outbreaks. Cotton-tipped
swabs were moistened with sterile saline and surfaces
vigorously scrubbed. Potential fomites included ventila-
tor control panel and sensor, bed rails, supply cabinets,
computer keyboards and mice, curtains, air vents, door
handles, supply carts, and mattresses.
Transtracheal aspiration specimens were inoculated
onto blood agar and MacConkey agar and incubated at
37°C for 48 h in an air incubator. Environmental swabs
were incubated overnight in fastidious broth and then
subcultured onto blood agar and MacConkey agar. Iden-
tification was conducted using the VITEK2 Compact 30
System (bioMerieux). The antimicrobial susceptibility
was determined by microdilution in accordance with the
Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute guidelines.
Molecular typing
Epidemiological typing of isolates was performed by
rep-PCR fingerprinting (DiversiLab System) as previ-
ously described. Data were sent via an individual
secured website (https://gzmedical.diversilab.com/) and
analyzed with DiversiLab version 3.5, using the Pearson
correlation coefficient and the unweighted pair group
method. The isolates clustered ≥95% was considered
related.
Infection control interventions
Standard infection control measures were reinforced
during the early outbreak (August 1–11). These included
re-emphasizing hand hygiene; using alcohol foam be-
tween patient contacts following five moments of hand
hygiene practices as recommended by the World Health
Organization; and the practice of sterile techniques for
all invasive procedures.
The crisis control staff decided to implement the
enhanced control interventions, after five new cases
were diagnosed during the early outbreak. Enhanced
control interventions were implemented. (1) A cohort
strategy was implemented. Colonized/infected patients
were separated into different areas. The newly admitted
patients were also separated and treated by a different
team of healthcare workers (HCWs). (2) Inappropriate
wearing of gloves in the ICU was strictly prohibited, and
violators were financially penalized. One month merit
pay should be kept out to pay for the reeducation. (3)
The ICU was divided into two zones for daily cleaning,
with separation of the clinical area and the HCW living
area. The cleaning and decontamination criteria wereformulated. The performance of regular environmental
cleaning procedures in every shift was evaluated. (4)
Unnecessary transfer of patients from other units or
surrounding hospitals was stopped. Patients no longer
requiring intensive care were immediately transferred to
another unit with contact precautions. (5) Contact pre-
cautions were practiced for all patients upon admission.
Continuation of contact precautions during ICU stay
depended on the detection of IRAB in the first culture
result. (6) Education crisis control staff reported progress
of the outbreak and emphasized infection control lapses
during the doctors’ and nurses’ shifts. The cleaning staffs
were retrained.
Written informed consent for participation in the
study was obtained from all participants.
Statistical analysis
Continuous variables were described as mean and
standard deviation, or median and interquartile range if
they showed a skewed distribution. Categorical variables
were described with absolute percentages. Continuous
variables were analyzed by the Student’s t-test or the
Mann–Whitney U test for non-parametric distributions.




In mid-August 2011, the Infection Control Department
was notified that there was an outbreak of IRAB infec-
tion. During the outbreak period, 11 patients had IRAB-
positive cultures isolated from the lower respiratory
tract. The mean age of affected patients was 65 years
(range: 39–85 years). The antibiotic susceptibility pat-
terns of the clinical isolates were identical, and the
isolates were resistant to the majority of antibiotics, in-
cluding carbapenems. An outbreak control team was
established including ICU doctors and a head nurse,
bacteriologists, infection control officer, and nurses. At
the beginning of the outbreak, covert observation found
that some doctors and nurses were wearing gloves all
the time. The timeline of the outbreak investigation is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Isolation of IRAB
The distribution of patients with IRAB acquisition in the
ICU and imported to the ICU during 2011 is shown in
Figure 3. The number of patients that acquired IRAB in
the ICU increased with the number of imported patients
with IRAB. The majority of patients who were admit-
ted to the ICU had pulmonary disease [severe pneu-
monia 16/25, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD) 12/25], and all were treated with mechanical
ventilation, therefore, we focused our analysis on bacteria
Figure 2 Progression of IRAB outbreak in the ICU. Line indicates the hospital stay periods in the ICU. The gray block indicates the period of IRAB
nosocomail infection. The shaded block represents the patients who were infected with IRAB before ICU admission.
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were also resistant to commonly used antibiotics, except
polymyxin B and colistin. All of these strains were multi-
drug resistant.
Case–control study
The demographic risk factors for nosocomial acquisition
of IRAB and outcome were compared between the case
and control groups. The patients who were diagnosed
with COPD upon admission to the ICU were predis-
posed to infection with IRAB (P = 0.028). The hospitalFigure 3 Monthly report of new cases of IRAB infection.mortality rate in the case group was higher than in the
control group (P = 0.032) (Table 1).
Environmental and hand surveillance
In August 23, 310 environmental samples were col-
lected. Nine (2.90%) samples were found to be culture
positive for IRAB. These strains were isolated from com-
puter keyboards (n = 3), bed rails (n = 3), nurses’ supply
carts (n = 2), and a ventilator control panel (n = 1). The
distribution of culture samples positive for IRAB from
the environment and from patients is shown in Figure 3.







Age (years) 65.09 ± 12.65 63.86 ± 14.33 0.824
Gender, male (%) 5 (45.46) 5 (35.71) 0.622
Prior hospital stay (<1 year) 3 (27.27) 2 (14.29) 0.420
Length of stay in ICU (days) 6 (3–25) 11 (2.75–25.75) 0.784
APACHE II score upon ICU admission 21.82 ± 7.13 21.50 ± 8.04 0.919
SOFA score upon ICU admission 6.55 ± 3.14 7.00 ± 6.49 0.762
Primary ICU admission diagnosis
Chronic pulmonary disease 8 (72.72) 4 (28.57) 0.028
Pneumonia 8 (72.72) 8 (57.14) 0.42
Diabetes mellitus 1 (9.09) 2 (14.28) 0.692
Hypertension 2 (18.18) 5 (35.71) 0.332
Malignancy 2 (18.18) 3 (21.42) 0.84
Surgery procedure (<30 days) 1 (9.09) 5 (35.71) 0.122
Antibiotic classesb
Carbapenem 7 (63.63) 6 (42.86) 0.302
Penicillins 3 (27.27) 6 (42.56) 0.420
Piperacillin/tazobactam 5 (45.45) 6 (42.86) 0.897
Cefepime 7 (63.63) 6 (42.86) 0.302
Fluoroquinolones 3 (27.28) 3 (21.42) 0.734
Glycopeptide 6 (54.54) 8 (57.14) 0.716
Antifungal 4 (36.36) 4 (28.57) 0.678
ICU procedures
Ventilator 11 (100) 14 (100) –
Blood transfusion 5 (45.45) 7 (50) 0.821
Hemodialysis 0 (0) 4 (28.57) 0.053
Nasogastric tube 11 (100) 12 (85.71) 0.191
Venous central catheter 10 (81.82) 13 (92.86) 0.859
Peripheral venous catheter 11 (100) 13 (92.86) 0.366
Arterial catheter 4 (36.36) 6 (42.86) 0.742
Urinary catheter 11 (100) 14 (100) –
Outcome
28-day mortality 3 (27.27) 2 (14.29) 0.420
Hospital mortality 6 (54.56) 3 (21.42) 0.032
aAll data are presented as the number, with the percentage in parenthesis, with the exception of age, APACHE II score, and SOFA score, which are presented as
mean ± standard deviation. Length of ICU stay was presented as median (interquartile range).
bCase group: used within 30 days before the first IRAB isolate was discovered and the antibiotics had been used for at least 72 h. Control group: antibiotics had
been used in the ICU for at least 72 h.
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hospital care workers (doctors, nurses, and cleaners), four
(26.67%) tested positive for IRAB; one of these was from
the hands of a hospital care worker and three were from
gloves. The samples from the HCW’s hands were collected
without forewarning, and some were collected immediately
after the HCW had been in direct contact with patients.As a result of the continuing number of cases being
reported, an environmental survey was conducted in
November and December 2011. In November, 620
environmental samples were collected. At the same time,
10 (1.61%) samples were collected from the hands (or
gloves) of hospital care workers. Twenty-one isolates
were found to be culture positive for IRAB. These
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keyboards (n = 2), curtains (n = 1), ventilator air flow
sensor (n = 1), ventilator control panel (n = 1), supply
cart (n = 1), and a bedside cabinet (n = 1). No samples
from the hands (or gloves) tested positive for IRAB. In
December, 620 environmental samples were collected, as
well as samples from the hands (or gloves) of 10 hospital
care workers, but only one isolate from a mattress was
found to be culture positive for IRAB.
Molecular typing of IRAB clinical and environmental
isolates
We analyzed molecular typing of 39 strains, including
24 isolated from the environment in August, November,
and December 2011; 15 of which were isolated from
clinical samples during the environmental survey. Diver-
siLab revealed seven clones (designated A–G) (Figure 4).
The most common was Clone D, which accounted for
16 (41.02%) of the 39 isolates. Clone D included eight
clinical isolates, seven environmental strains, and one
isolate from an HCW’s hand. These data suggest that
Clone D was the predominant clone of the outbreak in
the ICU.
Discussion
Since 2008, there have been reports of ICU outbreaks
caused by IRAB in our ICU [14]. The isolation rate of A.
baumannii was 39.90% and the imipenem-resistance rate
was 85%; ISAba1-associated blaOXA-23 genes were preva-
lent in IRAB, with an isolation rate of 82.5% in 2011
(our unpublished data). Several IRAB nosocomial out-
breaks with the ISAba1-associated blaOXA-23 resistance
mechanism have been reported [15]. Prevention of
epidemic outbreaks of A. baumannii is a challenging
task in our ICU.
It has been reported that computer keyboards and cur-
tains are contaminated with bacterial pathogens, which
can act as reservoirs of nosocomial pathogens [16-18].
Bed rails and supply carts are considered to be high-touch
surfaces [19]. Furthermore, bed rails have been previously
shown to have the highest frequency of contamination
with A. baumannii [20,21]. In the present outbreak,
environmental survey results revealed that bed rails were
the objects most frequently found to be contaminated,
followed by computer keyboards, and supply carts. Our
findings were consistent with previously published data.
Covert observation found that some doctors and
nurses wear gloves when contacting clean area items,
such as operating the ventilator and computers. There-
fore, we speculated that gloved HCWs contaminated
equipment (such as computer keyboards, supply carts,
and ventilator panels) with IRAB and disseminated the
outbreak strains in the ICU. Swab cultures from the
hands (or gloves) of HCWs found IRAB, and DiversiLabanalysis showed that the strains isolated from the hands
(or gloves), equipment, and clinical samples were Clones
D–F. We identified transient hand (or glove) carriage,
and confirmed that cross-transmission of IRAB was
involved in hand contamination. We suggest that equip-
ment was contaminated via the hands or contaminated
gloves of HCWs. These data further suggest that the en-
vironment may be secondarily contaminated by patients,
who then become a potential reservoir [22].
We impose financial penalties to prohibit contact the
cleaning equipment with gloves. From the environmen-
tal culture results in December 2011, this intervention
was efficient at preventing IRAB contamination, and the
detection rate in environmental culture decreased from
2.90% (9/310) to 0.16% (1/620). This observation dem-
onstrated that HCWs tend to wear gloves as a means of
self-protection, rather than to prevent cross-infection of
patients, which is consistent with hand hygiene using an
alcohol-based hand rub [23].
We also analyzed homology of IRAB recovered from
patients during the environmental survey. On August
23, 2011, nine infected patients stayed in the ICU. Diver-
siLab data demonstrated that six strains (P3, 9, 8, 10, 12,
and 13 August) recovered from these patients belonged to
Clone D. Five of these strains were isolated from nosoco-
mially infected patients. One strain (P3-Aug) was recov-
ered from a patient admitted on July 22, 2011, who had
been infected with IRAB before admission, and cultured
positively throughout admission. The remaining three
clinical isolates (P17, 18, and 19 August) belonged to
different clones that were isolated from patients in-
fected with IRAB before admission and were transferred
from another hospital. Therefore, we speculated that
the original outbreak may have been from the patient
with P3-Aug.
Epidemiological typing results suggested that the ICU
had four epidemic clones (D–G) in the outbreak. The
August clones remained in the environment and infected
patients through to December 2011. It may be difficult
to eradicate IRAB in ICU outbreaks [22], especially with-
out closing ICU even with improved infection control
practice [24,25]. Our intervention decreased the number
of contaminated surfaces and resulted in a sustained
reduction in the number of IRAB-infected patients.
Reduction the rate of nosocomial infection by surveil-
lance and prevention program could be benefited from
the Hawthorn effect [26,27]. Successful control outbreak
depends on the cooperation of the ward staff [27]. In the
present outbreak, covert observation had been executed
which would influence the behavior of ICU staff. The
outbreak control team including ICU doctors and nurse
except bacteriologist and infection control officer. This
can create a sense of ownership of infection control and
then form cooperation among them.
Figure 4 Rep-PCR-based similarity analysis and gel images for 39 IRAB isolates from clinical and environmental samples. Number presents the
nember of beds. BC: bedside cabinet; BR: bed rail; C: curtain; G: gloves; H: hand; KB: computer keyboard; KB ST: computer keyboard at nurses’
station; M: mattress; P: patient; SC: supply cart; VCP: ventilator control panel; VS: ventilator air flow sensor.
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mended for outbreak control in some previous studies
[28,29], but not in others [12,30,31]. In our setting, there
was no available ICU to transfer the infected patients
and we needed to keep the unit open. Therefore, our pa-
tients were immediately transferred out from the ICU
once they were clinically stabilized, to reduce infection
with IRAB and HCW workload.
Patients admitted to our ICU are often already in-
fected (severe pneumonia was present in 16/25 patients).
To control the outbreak, we implemented aggressive
interventions of contact isolation for all patients after
their admission, and the contact isolation was main-
tained until a negative culture result was obtained. By
using enforced contact isolation, the chance of patho-
gens spreading during the time from patients’ admission
to contact isolation can be reduced.
The present studies had some limitations. We demon-
strated that the environment may be secondarily con-
taminated by the patients. To find the source of
infection may need a long period of monitoring. The ef-
fects of HCW workload and the cost of extra cleaning
were not investigated.
Conclusion
The outbreak was controlled by a multidisciplinary
approach. The study highlights the importance of glove
removal. Contact isolation for all patients at admission
may be an effective measure to avoid outbreaks of A.
baumannii in endemic areas.
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